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BRIEFER CONTRIBUTIONS
TtIE CONSISTENCY OF TESTIMONIAL ACCURACY'
ALFRED KURANER2
For possibly a quarter of a cen-
tury, psychologists have been point-
ing out that the testimony of wit-
nesses, be their intentions honorable
or otherwise, is often unreliable and
inaccurate. Furthermore, these pys-
chologists insist on a more scientific
procedure in handling cases where
the errors of testimony due to hu-
man weaknesses may be present. In
pursuance of this phase of legal psy-
chology, hundreds of experiments
have been performed to prove the
unreliability of testimony, and the
percentages of accuracy and com-
pleteness of the testimony of groups
of witnesses have been worked out
to a rather fine degree.
The attitude of the courts toward
psychology is indicated in Strand
v. State,3 where it was held that
'The experiment herein reported
was performed in the Psychology
Laboratory of the University of
Kansas. The writer wishes to thank
Doctor Beulah M. Morrison for her
advice and assistance in performing
the experiment aid in preparing this
report.
2State University, Lawrence, Kansas.
336 Wyo. 78, 252 Pac. 1030.
The words of the court follow:
"Before the prosecutrix was put on
the stand, the state examined two
witnesses to show her mental capac-
ity. One of these witnesses gave
some hearsay testimony as to a mental
test, stating that the report of the test
showed that the prosecutrix had an
intelligence quotient of 104 (100 be-
ing the average) and that this indi-
cated that she was above the average
evidence of the intelligence quotient
of a ten year old prosecutrix was
objectionable and unnecessary.
Wigmore probably expresses the
general attitude of the legal pro-
fession when he says, "But where
are these practical psychological
tests, which will detect specifically
the memory failure and the lie on
the witness stand? . . . If there
is ever devised a psychological test
for the valuation of witnesses, the
law will run to meet it . ..
Whenever the psychologist is really
ready for the courts, the courts are
ready for him."4
One of the faults in working with
experiments in testimony in the past
has been that, although group ac-
curacy and completeness have been
determined on numerous occasions,
the individual himself has been neg-
lected. That is, we do not know
whether or not a particular indivi-
dual's testimony is consistently ac-
curate or inaccurate; whether an
individual who is unusually accurate
in reporting one incident is neces-
in mental ability. This evidence was
probably objectionable. . .. It was
also unnecessary. . . . When thejury had seen the prosecutrix on the
stand, and heard her give all her
testimony, they then had a so much
better way of judging of her intel-
ligence, that we are sure they could
not have been influenced by the ob-jectionable evidence about the mental
test."
4J. H. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evi-
dence (1923), Vol. 2, § 875.
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sarily accurate in reporting the
next. In this paper we speak only
of the witness who honestly tries
to report things as he saw them, and
not of the witness who deliberately
falsifies.
Of great significance is Hugo
Munsterburg's experiment of more
than twenty years ago, ' wherein he
showed that of the eighteen men
(out of a class of about one hun-
dred) who did not see the very ob-
vious movements of his left hand,
once he had centered their atten-
tion on his right, fourteen were the
the same witnesses who reported, in
all seriousness, that of the two,
colors held before them, the light
grey was darker than the dark blue.
The possibilities indicated by Mun-
sterburg's experiment are as im-
portant as they are obvious. If
some witnesses are consistently far
below or far above average in their
testimony, despite their honest in-
tentions, and if their percentage of
accuracy could be determined by
some sort of test (see excerpt from
Wigmore on Evidence, quoted
above) before they enter the court
room, then their testimony could
be objectively evaluated according
to their test scores.
Several authorities have ex-
pressed their faith in the possibility
of such a procedure. For instance,
Chafee says: "Although the law
has refused to admit lay evidence
that a witness' mentality is low, ex-
cept when it approaches insanity,
because such evidence is too uncer-
tain, the report of a Binet-Simon
or other intelligence test would be
of distinct value to a trained judge
in weighing testimony."0
5Hugo Munsterburg, On the Wit-
ness Stand, 1908, pp. 28-31.OZ. Chafee, Jr., The Progress of
the Law, 1919-1921, Evidence, 35
Harvard Law Review, 302, 308.
As a step toward the ultimate
possibility of measuring the value
of testimony by means of test-
scores of witnesses, the experiment
herein reported was performed. It
consisted of enacting three inci-
dents, several weeks apart, before a
group of sixty-five students of gen-
eral psychology, most of them sopho-
mores in the university, and hav-
ing them report on the incidents
later. The reports consisted of giv-
ing a free report of the incident,
followed by answering a set of de-
tailed questions concerning the in-
cident.
In selecting the incidents, two im-
portant rules, suggested by Mar-
ston,7 were followed; first, the in-
cident must not be Wholly foreign
to the conscious content of the in-
dividual at the moment the incident
occurs; and, second, the incident
must have a logical meaning of its
own and must not contain any tricks
to increase the inaccuracy of the
testimony. The incidents selected
were similar to several used often
in experiments in testimony.
The first incident, intended to
cause a slight emotional shock to
the witnesses, was enacted as fol-
lows: The instructor was lecturing
as usual to her 11:30 elementary
psychology class. She was stand-
ing behind a long table at the front
of the room. At the north end of
the table was a stack of large charts
which had been used earlier in the
year in the same class, and on the
south end of the table was a front-
heavy device specially constructed
for the experiment, which presented
the appearance of bona fide appar-
atus. It was made mostly of wood,
'wire and electric switches, and on
7\V. A. Marston, Studies in Testi-
mony, JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
AND CRIMINOLOGY, Vol. 15, p. 5, 1924-
1925.
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its front were five light bulbs in-
serted in the same number of
sockets. At 11:38 a graduate stu-
dent in the psychology department
entered the room, walked tu the
north end of the tabie, picked up
the charts, and, holding them hori-
zontally, started to walk out of the
room. As he reached the end of
the table, he struck the apparatus
with the charts, as if by accident,
so that it fell to the floor with a
crash, breaking one of the bulbs.
The student picked up the apparatus
and placed it in full view of every-
one in the class, following which
the instructor rebuked him mildly
for his carelessness.
Nothing more was said in class
concerning the incident until one
week later, when the instructor
brought up the subject with the fol-
lowing remarks:
"Some questions have arisen con-
cerning the incident that occurred
in this class recently, at which time
a piece of apparatus was knocked
from the table. We are going to
ask that each of you assist us by
writing an independent account of
what happened. Take a clean sheet
of paper, write your name at the
top, and then write the account."
After sufficient time had been al-
lowed for each student to write a
free report of the incident, the
papers were collected and the in-
structor continued as follows: "Now
we ask you to answer certain ques-
tions about that same incident.
Number the questions as they are
asked, and write the answers only."
Each student wrote the answers in-
dependently.
There were forty-one questions.
In order to keep the number of
variables as small as possible, the
proportion of questions relating to
color, dimensions, time, and the like,
was kept the same for all three in-
cidents. The form of questions also
was kept the same; that is, the same
proportion of leading ann -lirect
questions, etc., was Kept constant.
A few students, not quite certain
of their opinions, suspected before
all the questions had been asked,
that the whole procedure was an
experiment, but, on the whole, the
papers indicated tnat the students
were earnestly trying to help solve
the difficulties which seemed to have
arisen.
The results of the experiment
conformed in general to the results
of other experiments in testimony.
The free reports were compara-
tively accurate, but also very in-
complete. The answers to ques-
tions, which were intended to cor-
respond to the direct and possibly
the cross examination of the court
room were very inaccurate. For
instance, of the fifty-five students
who answered the question, only
nine remembered that there were
five lights on the face of the ap-
paratus. The other answers varied
from two to twelve, thirteen of the
witnesses declaring that there were
six, and almost an equal number
stated that there were three or four
light bulbs on the face of the ap-
paratus. The estimates as to the
number of lights broken also varied
from two to twelve, whereas the
device had been placed on the table
in such a way that every one in the
class could see that only one had
really been broken. The graduate
student entered the room at 11:38.
In answer to the question as to what
time he entered the room, the re-
ports varied from ten minutes to
eleven to ten minutes after twelve.
Two students answered that he en-
tered before half past eleven, prob-
ably forgetting for the moment that
they were not even in the class
-room before that time. On the
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whole, however, the percentage of
accuracy on the part of the students
was about as high as is usually
found in experiments in testimony.
The second incident was enacted
about two weeks later under ap-
proximately the same circumstances
as the first. The incident follows:
As the instructor was lecturing to
her 11:30 class, a telegraph messen-
ger in uniform entered with a tele-
gram and handed it to the instruc-
tor. He went through a number of
little acts, such as stealing a foun-
tain pen from the desk, making a
notation on a writing pad, etc., all
of which had been previously re-
hearsed, so that answers to the ques-
tions concerning his actions could
be controlled.
A week later the students were
asked to write free narrative re-
ports of the incident, and then were
asked to answer about fifty detailed
questions in the manner of exam-
ination in the court room. Since
this incident was one which might
happen at any time, none of the
students indicated in any way that
they suspected it was an experiment
until the questioning. They then
knew, of course, that it was simply
an experiment, but the papers in-
dicated that they were seriously
trying to do their best to write ac-
curate reports and to answer the
questions correctly.
A number of the questions were
unreasonable, but some of the ques-
tions asked of witnesses in court
are equally unreasonable. For in-
stance, a question as to the number
on the messenger's cap could quite
conceivably have been asked in court.
On the whole, the set of questions for
the second incident was more diffi-
cult than that for the first. Of the
sixty-one witnesses who handed in
papers, twenty-eight said correctly
that the incident happened one
week before the questioning, on the
preceding Monday, March 19. The
remaining answers varied from
March 6 to March 21. Curiously
enough, twenty-one students re-
membered for an entire week that
the messenger carried a pencil be-
hind his ear. In response to the
question, "Did the messenger at any
time place his right hand on the
table?" fifteen answered, "Yes," but
only one student in the entire group
saw him calmly pick up the foun-
tain pen from the table and place it
in his pocket.
The third incident was not an
incident at all. Since a high degree
of correlation was expected in the
consistency of accuracy of testi-
mony of individuals for the first and
second incidents, this incident was
included as a preliminary step in
determiniig whether a difference in
the amount of time elapsing be-
tween the incident and the giving
of testimony would tend toward a
lower degree of correlation in the
consistency of the witnesses in their
testimony between the third and the
other two incidents. It consisted
simply of showing to the members
of the class a large cinema poster
for seventeen seconds after which
they were asked to write as com-
plete a description of the poster as
they could. They were then asked
a number of questions, in which the
proportion of questions relating to
time and color and the like was the
same as in the first two incidents.
In allowing a week to elapse be-
tween the incident and the testi-
mony in the first two incidents, the
effect was the same as in actual liti-
gation or prosecution; that is, sel-
dom any less, and in most cases
more than a week's time elapses be-
tween an incident and subsequent
testimony concerning it. Each in-
cident was rehearsed before being
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given in class, and the answers to
questions were noted then, and sub-
sequently checked when the incident
was presented in class.
The system of grading papers
was somewhat difficult to devise,
and required careful consideration.
It is to be noted that an answer of
"I don't know" is preferable to an
incorrect answer 8 A witness who
is cautious enough to avoid guess-
ing is certainly more helpful in ar-
riving at the truth of the matter
than one who answers indiscrim-
inately both questions he knows and
those which he does not know. It
was therefore decided to give the
witness credit for the percentage of
questions answered correctly out of
those which he answered, rather
than the percentage of questions
answered correctly out of the entire
number asked. An objective criteri-
on for the grading of free reports
was even more difficult to devise,
but when it was found that virtu-
ally every point brought out in any
of the papers was covered by the
questions pertaining to that same
incident (the questions in each case
were asked after the free reports
had been handed in, in order not
to refresh unduly the witness'
recollection) this solution presented
itself: (1) Count the separate facts
in each free report which would
serve as answers to the questions
concerning the incident in question.
(2) Divide this figure by the total
number of questions on that inci-
8Robert M. Hutchins and Donald
Slesinger, Some Observations in the
Law of Evidence-Memory, 41 Harv-
ard Law Review, 860.
"In other words, it is safe enough
to trust absolute subjective certainty
as an indication of objective ac-
curacy, but anything less than abso-
lutc is no better (and it may be
worse) than absolute uncertainty."
dent to obtain a percentage of com-
pleteness. (3) Then find the pro-
portion of correct answers to all
the answers (on facts covered by
the questions) brought out in that
free report to determine the per-
centage of accuracy. (4) Average
the accuracy and completeness per-
centages for the free report score.
These methods of grading the an-
swers to questions and the free re-
ports may or may not be sound;
but since they were used consistently
throughout the experiment, the cor-
relations of the accuracy of the
various individuals' testimony should
not be greatly affected by the grad-
ing system.
The Pearson product - momentO
method of correlation was used in
treating the data statistically. The
object of the experiment was to
show the consistency of the ac-
curacy or inaccuracy of the testi-
mony of individuals. Thus, if the
witness who received the highest
grade in answering the questions
of the first incident, had received
the highest grade in answering the
questions of the second incident,
the next highest in the former had
received the next highest in the lat-
ter, and so on down the line, there
gThe Pearson product-formula is
r = Yxy
(See H. E. Garrett, Sta-
Naxoy
tistics in Psychology and Education,
1926, pp. 168 ff.) A perfect positive
correlation (+ 1.00) between two
variables, as intelligence and testi-
monial accuracy, indicates that as one
increases the other does also in ex-
act proportion. A perfect negative
correlation (- 1.00) indicates that as
one variable increases, the other de-
creases in exact proportion. A zero
correlation (0.00) indicates no re-
lationship between the variables.
Actual correlations obtained from
scientific data range between + 1.00
and - 1.00.
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would be a perfect positive correla- to be true. The table of correla-
tion. Quite the opposite was found tions follows:
Variables or Factors
Free report, incident No. 1
with
Answers to questions, No. I
Free report, incident No. 1
with
Free report, incident No. 2
Free report, incident No. 1
with
Free report, incident No. 3
Free report, incident No. 2
with
Free report, incident No. 3
Free report, incident No. 2
with
Answers to questions, incident No. 2
Free report, incident No. 3
with
Answers to questions, incident No. 3
Answers to questions, incident No. I
with
Answers to questions, incident No. 2
Answers to questions, incident No. 1
with
Answers to questions, incident No. 3
Answers to questions, incident No. 2
with
Answers to questions, incident No. 3
Average of all scores for all inci-


















The first requisite for the reli-
ability of a correlation is that it
exceed the product of at least four
times its probable error.'0 The ex-
I0 The formula used here for com-




(See Garrett, op. cit. p. 170.)
A simple illustration may indicate
planation of the reason for this
rul6 is not within the scope of this
the significance of the probable error.
If we were to attempt to find the
average salary of a million wage earn-
ers, it would be iomewhat impractical
to handle a million numbers. We
therefore take 500 cases at random,
and find that the average salary is $30
per week with a probable error of
± $5. This means that if we were
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paper, but it is to be noted that all
the correlation figures were low and
all the probable error figures were
high. In fact, of the ten correla-
tions above, only two exceed the
product of four times the probable
error, and these two do so only by
a narrow margin. In several of the
remaining instances, the probable
error even exceeds the correlation.
Furthermore, a correlation figure of
less than .65 is too small to be in-
dicative of any substantial correla-
tion, so that taken as a whole, there
to take another 500 cases at random,
the chances are exactly even that the
average would fall between $25 and
$35, but not necessarily at $30. On
the other hand, if our probable error
had been !- $25 instead of =L" $5,
the chances would be even that the
average would fall between $5 and
$55 for the next 500 cases. Obvi-
ously, although the average is the
same in both cases, the first one, hav-
ing a smaller probable error, is more
reliable than the second.
Applying these remarks to the case
at hand, we find, for example, a cor-
relation between the free report of
the first incident with the answers to
questions of that incident of + .08
with a probable error of :h .095. This
means that if we were to perform the
experiment in exactly the same way
with another group of the same num-
ber and about the same ability, the
chances are exactly even that the cor-
relation would fall between - .015
and + .175 which is obviously so
wide a range that we are forced to
conclude that our correlation is not
reliable for that reason, in addition to
its being so small as not to indicate
a substantial relationship.
It follows, then, that the smaller
the probable error, the more reliable
is the figure in question. Statisticians
have reached the rule that a correla-
tion must exceed the product of four
times its probable error to be reli-
able. The reason for that rule, and
the means for reaching the probable
error formula cannot be given in the
space available here. See F. C. Mills.
Statistical Methods, 1924, p. 160.
is almost perfect lack of correla-
tion which indicates little consist-
ency in the individual's testimony
regarding these three incidents.
The last correlation figure in the
table refers to the correlation be-
tween the average of all the grades
of each individual, and his grade
in the psychological examination
which he took upon entering the
university. It has been found that
the psychological entrance exam-
inations (intelligence tests) to the
University of Kansas, agree quite
well with the subsequent scholastic
records of the students; neverthe-
less, in this experiment as shown
above, there was no correlation be-
tween the scores in the psycholog-
ical examinations and the averages
of the grades for each individual
for all three incidents.
It would seem, then, that if the
proper method has been used in
carrying out the experiment, that
there is no reason to believe that
those who testify accurately on one
incident, will necessarily testify ac-
curately on another. Those who
scored high in one part of the test
failed in the next. The noticeably
higher correlation figure in two in-
stances in the above correlation
table is unexplained, but it is to be
noted that they are still too low to
be of any value, particularly since
they exceed the product of four
times their probable error by such
a narrow margin.
Giving testimony is' commonly
said to consist of observation, recol-
lection, and communication or nar-
ration."" Although it is probable
that neither observation nor nar-
ration is entirely at fault for the
lack of correlation in the present
experiment, neither is it accurate to
"J. H. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evi-
dence (1923), Vol. I, § 478.
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assume that they were not of some
influence in the final result. It is
highly probable, however, that the
strongest variable leading to the
lack of correlation is recollection,
but there is no way of proving it
from this experiment. The diffi-
culty with experiments in testimony
is fundamental and inherent. We
say testimony consists of observa-
tion, recollection, and narration,
but these constituent elements are
not mutually exclusive, and there-
fore not separable. Each of these
elements in turn contains an in-
finite number of elements, varying.
with the incident. The fact is that
each situation is a whole involving
so many variables that any analysis
of it borders on the impossible. It
is hopelessly impracticable to isolate
the objective elements which affect
an individual's testimony; it is
equally impossible to isolate the
subjective elements which ulti-
mately result in testimony. Disre-
garding these practical difficulties,
we blindly proceed, in this experi-
ment and similar ones, to attempt
to place objective values on in-
tricate subjective concepts; the
"assignment of numerical values to
non-quantitative material" is al-
most certain to be misleading.12
Other criticisms to the experi-
ment suggest themselves. For in-
stance, there was too little differ-
ence between the subjects. To be
sure, they range from the highest
ten per cent to the lowest ten per
cent in their scores on their psy-
chological examinations taken upon
entering the university, but even so,
there are not the tremendous dif-
ferences among them that we find
among witnesses actually before the
'
2 Donald Slesinger and E. Marion
Pilpel, Psychological Bulletin, De-
cember, 1929, Vol. 26, p. 679.
court. There are usually no morons
in the university, but morons are
occasionally asked to testify in
court. There are differences in in-
telligence- among university stu-
dents, but these differences are
small when compared to those
among the thousands of individuals
who come before the courts as wit-
nesses. If an experiment similar
to the one herein described were
performed on a group wherein the
differences in intelligence were
greater than they are in a uni-
versity class, there might be found
a greater" consistency of testi-
monial accuracy.
The fact that the subjects were
too nearly of the same intelligence
not only explains the lack of con-
sistency in accuracy, but also the
lack of correlation between the
average of testimony scores of each
subject with his intelligence test
score. Thus if the subjects had
represented all grades of intel-
lectual ability, from the imbecile to
the genius, it is quite probable that
the testimony grades would have
correlated at least slightly with in-
telligence test scores. For this rea-
son, the following paragraph of
Hutchins and Slesinger may be
sound if it is understood to apply
generally, and not to a group of
people of almost the same intel-
ligence:
"In evaluating the memory of a
particular person in a particular
situation, psychology has developed
a number of objective tests which
the courts are reluctant to admit.
The intelligence tests which have
been most widely used and are
therefore the best standardized may
be admitted in evidence without
hesitation. These tests, since they
have a high correlation with recall,
